Pythagoras. Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung, by Christoph Riedweg by Zhmud, Leonid
 1
Pythagoras. Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung. By Christoph Riedweg. München: C.H. Beck, 2002. 
Pp.207. EUR 19,90. ISBN: 3406487149. 
Leonid Zhmud 
Christoph Riedweg has offered us a well written introduction into a vexed 'Pythagorean 
problem'. Published in the popular series 'Denker der Antike', it is intended to familiarize a 
wider audience with contemporary scholarship on the most controversial figure in early Greek 
philosophy. The first part of the book treats the ancient stories and legends about Pythagoras 
(13-60); the second reconstructs a picture of the historical Pythagoras (61-128); the third is 
devoted to the early Pythagorean community and to the individual Pythagoreans of the 5th-
4th centuries (129-149); the last briefly sketches a history of Pythagoreanism in antiquity and 
its influence on the Renaissance and early modern thinkers (150-174). A useful chronological 
table shows many of the relevant figures, although the important early Pythagoreans Menestor 
and Hippon are missing, and Archippus and Lysis are misplaced.  The bibliography is rich 
and well-selected. 
Riedweg presents a picture that became popular following W. Burkert’s epoch-making 
Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), according to which 
Pythagoras was predominantly a religious thinker, very close to Orphism. He founded a sect, 
or a secret society, where his followers learned his oral doctrines and led a life regulated by 
hundreds of strict and absurd taboos. Developing and modifying this theme, Riedweg’s Py-
thagoras is no longer presented as an ecstatic 'shaman', but as a more respectable 'charismatic', 
who deserves a place amongst the Presocratics (99). Whereas Burkert radically denied any in-
volvement of Pythagoras and the early Pythagoreans with science and philosophy, Riedweg is 
more generous in this respect. But peaceful coexistence in his book between Ionian historia 
and Pythagorean religious speculations, taboos and number mysticism is achieved mostly by 
changing the criteria for what is counted as Greek natural philosophy and science. Between 
Anaximander’s geometrical cosmology and Parmenides’ deductive metaphysics comes some-
thing unexpected: Pythagoras’ half-mythical lore, born out of the exegesis of the Orphic the-
ogony (101-103). There is no need to deny that Pythagoras’ religious teaching was influenced 
by Orphism, as was the case with Empedocles. The problem is that one cannot explain Em-
pedocles’ physical, zoological, embryological, and botanical theories by referring to the Or-
phic doctrines. The home of these theories was Presocratic natural philosophy and Crotonian 
medicine. To find a common denominator, or a common source, for both poems of Empedo-
cles, On nature and Purifications, is, in my view, impossible. 
The problem with Pythagoras is even more complicated, mostly because in contrast to 
Empedocles, a) he did not write anything; b) he was prominent in various spheres of life, in-
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cluding politics, religion, philosophy and the exact sciences; c) he had many followers who 
also distinguished themselves in several of these spheres; and d) we possess many more late 
and unreliable sources on him than we do early and trustworthy ones. How does Riedweg deal 
with these problems? 
He begins his book with an image of Pythagoras that arose only in late antiquity, as a re-
sult of the cumulative efforts of the Hellenistic biographers, authors of pseudo-Pythagorica, 
and Neopythagorean/Neoplatonic writers. The sensational, the exotic, the supernatural and the 
irrational are the most important elements in this image. To be sure, late authors occasionally 
used early sources, although very selectively, and many legends about Pythagoras were in cir-
culation already in his own life time. Obviously, Pythagoras was the kind of person who at-
tracted legends, even if originally they were not connected with him: Andron of Ephesus (4th 
century BC) ascribed to Pythagoras the same miracle stories that were told earlier about 
Pherecydes of Syros. Given the inner logic of development of a narrative genre, the late biog-
raphies of Pythagoras accumulate this legendary material, especially because Porphyry and 
Iamblichus were not interested in the historical Pythagoras. Their ideal of philosophy already 
implied a religious way to the truth unknown to the Presocratics. Similar transformations hap-
pened with Homer, but one wonders whether it would be reasonable to devote a quarter of a 
book on Homer to the Stoic and Neoplatonic allegorical and mystical interpretations of his 
poems. 
This last point is especially pertinent because the second part of the book, 'In search of the 
historical Pythagoras' presents essentially the same image of Pythagoras as the first. In fact, 
much more consistently than any scholar before him Riedweg assimilates Pythagoras’ philos-
ophy with Orphism and with superstitions known from the so-called Pythagorean symbola (In 
antiquity this was attempted by Iamblichus: for symbola as an essence of Pythagoras’ philos-
ophy see Iambl. VP 81-82.) Religion occupies the central place in Pythagoras’ activities, and 
Riedweg makes all the other parts of his work revolve around this theme. Pythagoras’ politics, 
philosophy and science are thereby deprived of their independent history and logic, and be-
come meaningful only in religious-mythical context. The exact sciences – geometry, arithme-
tic, astronomy, and harmonics – which were the field of Pythagoras’ most significant discov-
eries, are reduced to a "speculative number theory with certain mythical characteristics" — 
which, in Riedweg’s view (120), is still a science, at least in the sense of Lévi-Strauss’ 'pensée 
sauvage'! He does not mention the sphericity of the earth, or the discovery of the five celestial 
zones, or the identification of the Morning and Evening stars with Venus, which are ascribed 
to Pythagoras in our sources. There is nothing about the deductive theory of odd and even 
numbers, as preserved in Euclid’s Elements (IX, 21-34), and nothing about the early Pythago-
rean theorems and theories, as mentioned in Eudemus’ History of geometry (fr. 136-137 
Wehrli). When something of this kind appears in the book, such as Pythagoras’ theorem, it is 
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not treated in the context of the history of Greek mathematics, i.e. as development of Thales’ 
attempts to prove deductively certain simple geometrical propositions, and as a prerequisite 
for Hippasus’ discovery of the irrational numbers. Hippasus’ discovery is given half a line 
(144), Thales’ geometry even less. Instead, Riedweg mentions twice that Pythagoras’ theorem 
'was already known in Mesopotamia in 1500 BC' (44, 119). In fact, what the Babylonians 
knew was not a general geometrical proposition, let alone its deductive proof, but only an 
empirical arithmetic formula for some Pythagorean triplets (i.e. 3, 4, 5; 5, 12, 13, etc). But 
why is this formula discovered in Babylonia thousand years before Pythagoras more relevant 
for understanding his mathematics, than what was worked out in Greece by his immediate 
teachers and students?  
Similarly, Pythagoras’ opposing principles, peras and apeiron are forcibly connected with 
the Orphic theogony (117-118), but thereby lose their close relationship with Anaximander’s 
apeiron and Anaximenes’ apeiros aer. As a result, early Pythagorean cosmogony, according 
to which apeiron, understood both as kenon and as pneuma is inhaled by cosmos and limited 
by peras, becomes utterly incoherent. Paradoxically, it is Orphism that brings coherence to 
Pythagoras’ ideas and practice, and that is why Riedweg returns to the old and often refuted 
thesis that Pythagoras himself wrote a kind of Orphic exegesis. Although Riedweg does not 
insist on this thesis, he repeats it many times without offering any new evidence to support it. 
In fact, new evidence discovered during the last 30-40 years has significantly enriched our 
knowledge of Orphism, but virtually none of this evidence points to Pythagoras. 
In contrast to Pythagoras, no historically known early Pythagorean is connected with any-
thing supernatural, mystical, or superstitious in the reliable part of the tradition. The doctors 
Democedes and Alcmaeon, the olympionics Milon and Ikkos, the botanist Menestor, the phi-
losophers Hippon and Philolaus, and the mathematicians Hippasus and Theodorus all appear 
in our sources as being closer to Anaxagoras than to Empedocles. There is no evidence even 
of their belief in metempsychosis. Riedweg provides a short prosopographical list of these Py-
thagoreans at the end of the part III (142-149). Are they the same superstitious ritualists who 
could not travel on the main roads, use public baths, speak in the dark, step over a yoke, sit on 
a bushel measure, stir the fire with a knife, etc.? Riedweg’s unqualified 'yes' to this question 
underplays a crucial distinction; for whereas the 'rationalistic' image relies on the writings of 
the individual Pythagoreans and/or on the sources the 5th-4th centuries, the image of a sect 
with common property, secret and oral doctrines, five years silence etc. only appears around 
300 BC – by which time the Pythagorean school had already disappeared – and only reaches 
its final form under influence of the growing Christianity.  
In fact, even in the earliest works on the Pythagoreans pieces of authentic evidence were 
often mixed with alien material. In the late 5th century, the Milesian sophist Anaximander 
wrote an Explanation of Pythagorean Symbola. Used by Aristotle and later writers, this work 
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seems to be the original source for most of the Pythagorean ritualistic prescriptions, which 
regulated, in Riedweg’s view, their entire life. But Anaximander did not describe a way of life 
of any (named or anonymous) Pythagoreans. He collected – most probably, from the written 
sources – what he took to be the 'Pythagorean' sayings and maxims and interpreted them alle-
gorically, exactly as he did with the Homeric poems. If he knew of a real Pythagorean who 
did not break bread, step on nail parings or piss towards the sun, why did he interpret these 
taboos allegorically? Aristotle believed the literal sense of the taboos to be original, which 
seems very plausible, but he too had never heard of a Pythagorean really observing them. Ex-
cept for a few dietary prescriptions, directly related to metempsychosis (abstinence from meat 
of non-sacrificial animals, from beans, certain sorts of fish etc.) and some burial customs 
(Hdt. II, 81) all the other taboos appear only in context of interpreting 'Pythagorean' symbola. 
The origin of Anaximander’s collection remains a puzzle. Some taboos are historically at-
tested cult prescriptions, others are common superstitions. Some sayings are of Pythagorean 
provenance, and some not. His reason for collecting this heterogeneous material under the 
heading 'Pythagorean symbola' seems to have been the same as in Herodotus, for whom all 
'similar' religious phenomena have the same origin, namely Egyptian. Collection (Synagoge)  
by the sophist Hippias, another of Anaximander’s contemporaries, was specifically designed 
to collect supposedly similar ideas, taken from Greek poetry and philosophy. Hence, it is 
equally misguided to discern the realities of the vita Pythagorica behind every maxim that 
appears in Anaximander’s book and to claim (as Riedweg does) that Pythagoras’ natural phi-
losophy lies behind the saying 'The sea is the tears of Kronos'. Interestingly, when Riedweg 
attempts to extract the hidden meaning of this saying, he resorts to the very allegorical method 
of interpretation (100-101) that he abjures in the case of the taboos (91-92). Even more re-
vealingly, his explanation is the same as that proposed by Creuzer (1810) for the Greek mys-
teries, namely, that Pythagoras spoke in 'mystico-symbolical' language to the outside world, 
whilst providing his students with a philosophical interpretation of the same sayings. This 
theory was subjected to a devastating criticism by Lobeck (1829), to which I have nothing to 
add. 
Not all the parts of Riedweg’s book are equally influenced by his tendency to reduce Py-
thagorean science and philosophy to such a level where they can be successfully harmonized 
with myth, arithmology, and ritual. His exposition of post-classical Pythagoreanism is both 
informative and well-balanced. But as a whole this introduction should encourage readers to 
ponder a question that has preoccupied historians of Pythagoreanism for a long time: granted 
that on the personal level science and philosophy can coexist with myth and superstition, 
could a society founded on ritual taboos really have attracted so many generations of brilliant 
mathematicians and scientists, whilst failing to produce a ‘guru’ even remotely like its found-
er? 
